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14.1 Introduction
In the introduction to his Conference on Research in Income and
Wealth (CRIW) volume on services, Zvi Griliches (1992) reviewed ser-
vices-sector productivity trends, as well as issues in measuring services pro-
ductivity, as these matters stood in the early 1990s (see also his American
Economic Association presidential address; Griliches 1994). In this paper,
we analyze the rapid post-1995 productivity growth in services industries,
which as we show have contributed greatly to the strength of U.S. produc-
tivity growth in recent years. We also review some of the major measure-
ment issues that Griliches addressed, from roughly a dozen years on.
The contexts of the early 1990s and early 2000s are very diﬀerent yet, at
the same time, similar. Griliches wrote in the context of the post-1973 U.S.
productivity slowdown, which was the big puzzle of that day. He pointed
out that services were crucial to the post-1973 slowdown because produc-
tivity in services industries grew much more slowly than productivity in
goods-producing industries. Services, therefore, acted as a brake on U.S.
productivity growth, a conclusion that was unsettling because services
have represented an increasing share of U.S. economic activity, a pattern
that is also evident in Europe and other advanced economies.
The post-1973 puzzle was never resolved, just abandoned by economists
when they were confronted with a new problem—the acceleration of U.S.
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vious one (Triplett and Bosworth 2006), that accelerating productivity in
services industries played a crucial part in post-1995 U.S. productivity
growth. Indeed, in recent years services-industry labor productivity has
grown as fast as labor productivity in the rest of the economy, which is why
we have previously said that “Baumol’s disease has been cured.”1 In this,
our ﬁndings are a mirror image of the conclusions emphasized by
Griliches: both the post-1973 slowdown and the post-1995 acceleration
inU.S. productivity growth—both labor productivity and multifactor pro-
ductivity (MFP)—are located disproportionately, though not entirely, in
services. Services MFP growth has not been emphasized in other research
on the post-1995 resurgence in productivity, which has perhaps too
strongly emphasized high productivity growth in electronics-producing
industries.
In Griliches’ time and now, services industries are the industries that are
the most intensive users of information technology (IT) and communica-
tion technology capital equipment. But unlike Griliches, who complained
that the IT eﬀect on services productivity was invisible in the data of his
day, we ﬁnd that IT investments now make a substantial contribution to la-
bor productivity growth in services-producing industries. This, of course,
is another change from the early 1990s, when lagging services productivity
seemed a stiﬂing problem for economic growth.
As in most of his writing on productivity, Griliches (1992, 1994) empha-
sized measurement issues. He was perhaps the foremost of his generation
to insist that measurement is part of the science of economics (as it is in all
other quantitative sciences) and not just a low-order task to be left to sta-
tistical agencies. Data collecting may not itself be part of the science of
economics, but specifying what should be gathered and what is needed
foreconomic analysis certainly is. In this regard, Griliches noted the inade-
quate state of U.S. services-productivity statistics around 1990, which in-
cluded (but was not limited to) a major deﬁciency in the conceptual design
of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) industry database, as it then
existed:
The double-deﬂation procedure (the subtraction of deﬂated intermedi-
ate purchases from deﬂated gross output to arrive at a real value-added
concept) is itself troublesome, as is also the GNP by industry construc-
tion, which is based on a value-added measure of an industry’s out-
p u t ....  F o r  p r oductivity measurement purposes we would be much bet-
ter oﬀwith explicit and separate series on gross output and intermediate
inputs in constant prices. (Griliches, 1992, 8–9)
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1. See Triplett and Bosworth (2006). Baumol’s disease is the presumption, or perhaps the
consequence of the presumption, that it is inherently more diﬃcult to increase services pro-
ductivity than goods-producing productivity—see Baumol (1967).The measurement of services-sector productivity has advanced hugely
since the early 1990s. The best indicator of the improvement that has taken
place is displayed in our paper: we calculate MFP for two-digit services
industries based on gross output (not value added, as in most previous
industry-level studies), using a combination of government databases from
the BEA and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)—and implicitly the
Census Bureau, as the other two agencies’ compilations rest heavily on
data collected by the “economic directorate” part of the Census Bureau.
These industry measures incorporate as inputs capital services from diﬀer-
ent kinds of assets, including separate measures for capital services from
IT equipment, and deﬂated intermediate inputs, exactly along the lines that
Griliches recommended.
With the new database, we can compare productivity trends in goods-
producing and services-producing industries, we can calculate contribu-
tions to growth at the industry level using the well-known Solow frame-
work, and we can aggregate the industry productivity estimates to be
consistent with the aggregate productivity estimates that have appeared
in “macro” studies such as Oliner and Sichel (2000, 2002), Baily and
Lawrence (2001), Gordon (2000, 2002), and Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000).
None of this was possible a dozen years ago when Griliches wrote. It has
become possible largely because government agencies have implemented
some of the recommendations of Griliches and have also taken notice of
the substantial contributions to economic accounting of Dale Jorgenson
and his collaborators (for example, Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni
1987). With these great improvements to the government industry data-
base, we can ask and answer questions about post-1995 productivity
growth that were nearly impossible to confront for the post-1973 produc-
tivity slowdown.
The BEA industry accounts are constructed to be fully consistent with
the estimates of aggregate gross domestic product (GDP). They exist for
sixty-six industries, published annually, at roughly the two-digit industry
level of the old Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) system. After ex-
cluding government and the farm sector and combining some industries
for which the BLS does not estimate separate information on capital ser-
vices, we have ﬁfty-four industries (twenty-ﬁve in goods-producing, and
twenty-nine in service-producing) within the private nonfarm business sec-
tor, spanning the period of 1987–2001.2
The new database is described more fully in Triplett and Bosworth
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2. The BEA-BLS industry data set is an alternative to that developed by Dale Jorgenson
and his various coauthors. While they share many of the same sources, the BEA data oﬀer
more disaggregation of the service-producing industries. On the other hand, the Jorgenson
data are available for a longer time period, and they include measures of labor quality. There
are often considerable diﬀerences between the two data sets in the growth rates of output at
the level of individual industries.(2004). The database improvements are documented in Yuskavage (1996)
and in Lum, Moyer, and Yuskavage (2000). An evaluation of the current
data set and plans for its extension are outlined in Yuskavage (2001), and
more recent updates are Moyer et al. (2004) and Lawson et al. (2006).
14.2 Summary and Overview
It is now well known that aggregate U.S. labor productivity and MFP ac-
celerated after 1995, with the amount of the acceleration understandably
depending on the end period. Using 2002, for example, labor productivity
rose at a 2.8 percent annual rate since 1995, compared to 2.4 percent over
the 1995–2001 period (2001 was a recession year). In order to reduce the
sensitivity of our results to these end-point issues, we present mainly least-
squares trend rates of change, which give 2.5 percent per year for trend la-
bor productivity growth for the 1995–2001 interval (table 14.1), compared
with 1.0 percent for 1987–1995.
It is also well known that the sources of recent U.S. productivity advance
include capital deepening from increased investment in IT (information
and communications technology) and an acceleration in MFP growth. At
the macro level, these results for the United States have been presented in
Oliner and Sichel (2000, 2002), Baily and Lawrence (2001), Gordon (2000,
2002), and Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000); O’Mahoney and van Ark (2003)
review the international evidence.
We add to the evidence on recent U.S. productivity growth by comput-
ing labor productivity, MFP, and a contributions to growth model at
roughly the two-digit SIC level. Three reasons suggest the value of doing
productivity research at the industry level.
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Table 14.1 Labor productivity and multifactor productivity growth in goods-
producing and service-producing industries (trend rates of growth, 
value added per worker, BEA industry accounts)
1987–1995 1995–2001 Change
Labor productivity
Private nonfarm business 1.0 2.5 1.5
Goods-producing industries 1.8 2.3 0.5
Service-producing industries 0.7 2.6 1.8
Multifactor productivity
Private nonfarm business 0.6 1.4 0.9
Goods-producing industries 1.2 1.3 0.1
Service-producing industries 0.3 1.5 1.1
Source: Table A2-2 in Triplett and Bosworth (2004). As explained there, the aggregate pro-
ductivity numbers diﬀer from those published by BLS (see also footnote 5 in section 14.3 of
this paper).14.2.1 Aggregation
The Solow (1957) productivity paradigm concerns a production function.
The empirical application of the production function to any aggregation of
producing units always presents problems, but the production function
framework ﬁts an industry level of analysis better than the aggregate level.
Fisher (2003, 228) summarized extensive results on aggregation theory by
stating: “The question of . . . what meaning can be attached to aggregate pro-
duction functions . . . [is equivalent to asking] whether there is any system of
aggregation over diverse ﬁrms that results in some measure of eﬃciently pro-
duced aggregate output being a function of a capital aggregate and a labor
aggregate.” As Fisher has documented, the aggregation conditions are strin-
gent. They are undoubtedly not met even for industry data, but they are less
violently rejected for industry data. For example, one aggregation condition
requires that all ﬁrms must produce the same vector of outputs. This is non-
sense if aggregation proceeds over barber shops and computer factories, but
the output vectors of various barber shops must contain more correspon-
dence than those of barber shops and computer factories, whether the ag-
gregation conditions are exactly satisﬁed at the level of the barber shop in-
dustry. From this, it is reasonable to suppose that aggregation at the industry
level must perforce do less quantitative damage to the analysis (though it is
also true that one cannot prove this proposition).
Against this, one might contend that measurement errors are more se-
vere at the industry level. Grundfeld and Griliches (1960) pointed out long
ago that at the aggregate level some measurement errors oﬀset.
14.2.2 Sectoral Sources
A major issue surrounding recent U.S. productivity growth is whether
the United States has experienced any productivity growth outside the
electronics-manufacturing sector. Gordon (2000, 2002) has promoted the
view that most if not all of the U.S. productivity advance originates in com-
puter and semiconductor manufacturing.
Obviously, the way to resolve this question is to compute productivity
growth at the industry level, which we do. Our industry productivity
growth results show that the “only in electronics manufacturing” con-
tention is false—more than three-quarters of net labor productivity and
MFP growth since 1995 is in the services industries. Moreover, most of the
acceleration in labor productivity growth after 1995, and allof the acceler-
ation in MFP growth, took place in the services industries. The goods-
producing industries made no net contribution to the acceleration of U.S.
MFP growth after 1995. Though productivity growth is very rapid in elec-
tronics, the unprecedented productivity growth of the services industries
(both labor productivity and MFP growth) is the most striking attribute of
the recent advance in U.S. productivity.
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The contribution of IT to aggregate U.S. labor productivity growth is an-
other major research issue that is best approached at the industry level of
analysis. We estimate the overall contribution of IT by examining its con-
tribution in the industries and sectors where the IT is located—predomi-
nantly, in the services industries. We ﬁnd that 80 percent of the total con-
tribution of IT to aggregate U.S. labor productivity growth after 1995
arises from IT’s contribution in the services industries.
14.3 Method
We construct measures of labor and multifactor productivity for each of
the ﬁfty-four industries and various aggregates.
Labor productivity growth is the output index divided by a simple index
of the labor input. Multifactor productivity growth is the ratio of the out-
put index to a weighted average of the inputs, K, L, and M (capital and la-
bor services and intermediate inputs), so the rate of change in gross output
MFP is deﬁned:
(1) d ln MFP   d ln Q   [(1   v)(sld ln L   skd ln K)   vd ln M],
where d ln MFP designates the rate of growth of MFP (and similarly for
the other variables). Inputs include combined energy, materials, and pur-
chased services intermediate inputs (M) in addition to labor (L) and capi-
tal services (K), vequals the two-period average share of intermediate pur-
chases in gross output, and s1 and sk are the two-period averages of the
share of capital and labor income in value added. We compute a Törnqvist
chain index of the weighted annual changes in the inputs.3
We also estimate growth accounting equations for each of these indus-
tries in order to analyze the contributions of capital and materials deepen-
ing and MFP to the growth and acceleration of labor productivity:
(2) d ln LP   wKITd ln     wKNd ln     wMd ln     d ln MFP
In both equations, we disaggregate capital services, K, into IT capital (KIT)
and non-IT capital (KN).
14.4 Trends in Labor Productivity and MFP at the Industry Level
In this section, we report our estimates of labor productivity and MFP
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3. The output data of the BEA are aggregated using Fisher indexes. We switched to Törn-
qvist indexes only to take advantage of a slightly simpler algorithm.
4. This section and the following one summarize empirical work that is presented more fully
in Triplett and Bosworth (2004).Although we emphasize productivity estimates at the detailed level, the
outline of our major ﬁndings also emerges from direct sector-level esti-
mates, where industry value added and inputs are aggregated to the sector
level.5 As table 14.1 demonstrates, services-sector labor productivity ad-
vanced at a 2.6 percent trend rate in 1995 to 2001, compared with 2.3 per-
cent per year for the goods-producing sector. The post-1995 acceleration
in the services sector (at 1.8 percentage points) also far exceeds the accel-
eration of labor productivity growth in the goods-producing sector (0.5
points)—see table 14.1.
Similarly, MFP growth in the services sector exceeded MFP growth in
the goods-producing sector, post-1995 (1.5 percent per year, compared
with 1.3 percent). The services-producing sector accounts for all of the ac-
celeration in U.S. MFP growth because there was minimal acceleration in
MFP growth in the goods-producing sector, taken as a whole (only 0.1 per-
centage point). As we said in our previous paper (Triplett and Bosworth
2006, 34), “Baumol’s disease has been cured.”
The aggregations conceal much heterogeneity among the industries.
We compute industry labor productivity and MFP for twenty-ﬁve goods-
producing industries and twenty-nine services-producing industries.6 In
both goods-producing and services-producing sectors, some industries
experienced very high labor productivity growth, such as electronics in
goods-producing and brokerage/ﬁnance among services industries. Labor
productivity growth in the goods-producing sector is restrained by low
productivity growth in mining and negative productivity growth in con-
struction. A number of services sectors also had negative productivity
growth. These industries include hotels, entertainment and recreation,
and education. It is important to recognize that the net change in sector
productivity reﬂects the behavior of productivity in the individual indus-
tries within the sector, and within both services- and goods-producing
sectors, there are industries with negative as well as positive productivity
growth.
Tables 14.2 and 14.3 provide a detailed view of the changes in labor and
MFP for the twenty-nine services-producing industries. We focus on the
services-producing industries because they play such a dominant role in
the post-1995 productivity resurgence, and it is in this sector that the in-
dustry analysis oﬀers a diﬀerent interpretation of the resurgence compared
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5. As explained in Triplett and Bosworth (2004), these aggregations of BEA industry data
do not yield precisely the BLS published productivity numbers. Though the diﬀerences arise
from a number of respects in which BEA and BLS databases diﬀer, the major cause is the fact
that the BEA industry database is consistent with the income side of the accounts, where the
BLS productivity estimates are based on the expenditure side. This means that the rate of
growth in our aggregations is larger than in the BLS published numbers, but this is not a ma-
jor limitation on our results, partly because in the recently released benchmark revision of
GDP, the product side was revised more than the income side.
6. As noted earlier, our productivity estimates use a measure of gross output, rather than
value added, as in some past industry-level studies.to the macroeconomic analysis. The results for all ﬁfty-four industries are
provided in Triplett and Bosworth (2004).
In the services-producing sector, the overall growth in labor productiv-
ity and MFP camouﬂages a wide disparity of trends within the individual
two-digit industries. Advancing labor productivity in four large services in-
dustries—telephone, wholesale trade, retail trade, ﬁnance (both brokerage
and depository institutions)—drove the overall sector improvement. La-
bor productivity gains in these industries ranged from 3 to over 10 percent
per year after 1995, in all cases representing acceleration over the corre-
sponding rate before 1995 (table 14.2). These four industries represent over
a quarter of total value added in the private nonfarm business sector.
However, services-sector labor productivity growth is not just a story of
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Table 14.2 Growth in labor productivity in 29 service industries, 1987–2001 (annual trend rates
of change based on gross output)
Trend growth in output per worker
Industry Value added weight 1987–1995 1995–2001 Change
Railroad transportation 0.4 6.2 2.1 –4.1
Local and interurban passenger transit 0.2 –1.7 –0.6 1.1
Trucking and warehousing 1.6 3.4 0.8 –2.7
Water transportation 0.2 1.7 1.0 –0.7
Transportation by air 1.1 0.0 0.4 0.4
Pipelines, except natural gas 0.1 –0.7 1.2 1.8
Transportation services 0.4 2.0 3.5 1.5
Telephone and telegraph 2.6 5.5 7.9 2.5
Radio and television 0.7 0.0 1.8 1.8
Electric, gas, and sanitary services 3.4 2.1 2.0 –0.1
Wholesale trade 8.5 3.4 4.2 0.8
Retail trade 11.3 1.3 3.4 2.2
Depository institutions 4.0 2.9 3.1 0.2
Nondepository institutions 0.6 2.4 1.9 –0.6
Security and commodity brokers 1.4 7.2 10.3 3.2
Insurance carriers 1.9 –0.6 –1.7 –1.0
Insurance agents, brokers, and service 0.8 –3.3 2.8 6.1
Real estate (excluding owner-occupied 
housing) 6.6 2.7 1.7 –1.0
Hotels and other lodging places 1.0 1.0 –0.6 –1.6
Personal services 0.8 1.0 1.5 0.5
Business Services 5.2 2.9 3.6 0.7
Auto repair, services, and parking 1.1 0.9 1.5 0.6
Miscellaneous repair services 0.4 1.9 1.8 –0.1
Motion pictures 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.1
Amusement and recreation services 0.9 1.6 –0.4 –2.0
Health services 7.1 –0.7 0.9 1.6
Legal services 1.7 0.0 1.5 1.5
Educational services 0.9 0.2 –1.0 –1.1
Other services 4.9 –0.4 2.0 2.4
Source: Appendix table A-1 (Triplett and Bosworth 2004).a small number of large industries. Of the twenty-nine detailed services in-
dustries, twenty-four experienced labor productivity growth after 1995
and, of the positive growth industries, seventeen experienced acceleration.7
In two industries, accelerations or decelerations were marginal (only 0.1
percentage point), so they might better be set as zero acceleration indus-
tries. Negative labor productivity growth occurred after 1995 in ﬁve indus-
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7. This contrasts with the goods-producing sector, where post-1995 labor productivity
growth was positive in twenty-four out of twenty-ﬁve industries, but accelerated in only four-
teen of the twenty-four.
Table 14.3 Growth in multifactor productivity in 29 service industries, 1987–2001
(annual trend rates of change based on gross output)
Trend growth in 
multifactor productivity
Industry Domar weight 1987–1995 1995–2001 Change
Railroad transportation 0.7 3.4 1.5 –1.9
Local and interurban passenger 
transit 0.4 –1.0 1.3 2.3
Trucking and warehousing 3.4 0.9 –0.1 –1.0
Water transportation 0.6 1.6 0.2 –1.4
Transportation by air 1.9 2.5 –0.5 –2.9
Pipelines, except natural gas 0.1 –2.8 1.6 4.4
Transportation services 0.6 –0.3 0.2 0.5
Telephone and telegraph 4.3 1.7 1.2 –0.5
Radio and television 1.2 1.6 –4.5 –6.2
Electric, gas, and sanitary services 5.6 0.5 –0.6 –1.1
Whole trade 12.4 1.5 3.1 1.6
Retail trade 17.4 0.2 2.9 2.7
Depository institutions 5.6 0.2 1.5 1.3
Nondepository institutions 1.4 –0.2 2.1 2.4
Security and commodity brokers 2.4 3.1 6.6 3.5
Insurance carriers 4.1 –0.1 0.0 0.2
Insurance agents, brokers, and service 1.3 –3.6 –0.1 3.5
Real estate (excluding owner-occupied 
housing) 11.2 0.4 1.4 1.0
Hotels and other lodging places 1.7 0.0 –1.3 –1.3
Personal services 1.4 –0.9 0.4 1.3
Business Services 7.8 0.9 –0.6 –1.5
Auto repair, services, and parking 1.9 –1.4 1.4 2.8
Miscellaneous repair services 0.7 –1.1 –1.6 –0.5
Motion pictures 0.9 –1.2 0.2 1.4
Amusement and recreation services 1.6 0.1 –1.1 –1.2
Health services 10.7 –1.7 –0.5 1.2
Legal services 2.2 –0.8 0.9 1.7
Educational services 1.6 –0.2 –0.8 –0.5
Other services 8.5 –0.3 –0.1 0.2
Source: Appendix table A-1 (Triplett and Bosworth 2004).tries (two fewer than before 1995), but in one of them (local transit) labor
productivity actually accelerated, that is, the negative productivity growth
became less negative.
Multifactor productivity growth shows a more mixed picture in services
industries (table 14.3). The 2001 recession is not a factor in this as a simi-
lar mix was found in our previous paper, for which the post-1995 period
ended with 2000.
Strong MFP growth in a number of large industries—telephone, retail
and wholesale trade, and ﬁnance—was suﬃcient to oﬀset negative pro-
ductivity growth in other large industries, including hotels, health, educa-
tion, entertainment/recreation, and the “other services” (which is a com-
bination of several two-digit SICs). Multifactor productivity growth was
actually negative in twelve of the twenty-nine industries after 1995 (three
marginally so).
More than half of the services industries experienced accelerating MFP
after 1995. Acceleration after 1995 is associated with large swings from
negative to positive MFP growth in several industries (see, for example,
local transit, pipelines, auto repair, and legal services) and strong MFP
growth in the big industries of trade and ﬁnance. However, the acceleration
of MFP growth in medical care (though growth is still negative!) is one area
where the result is inﬂuenced by a methodological break in the index of real
output because new producer price index (PPI) measures of price changes
begin in 1991. Methodological breaks also occur in other industries, such
as miscellaneous services.
In summary, post-1995 productivity growth in the United States—both
productivity and MFP—was a product of strong and widespread produc-
tivity growth in the services industries. Because services industries by and
large did not exhibit strong productivity growth in the previous period, the
acceleration of U.S. productivity growth after 1995 is also a product of de-
velopments in the services industries.
14.5 The Aggregation of Industry Productivity Measures
The ﬁfty-four industries in the data set vary widely in size. Thus, while
tables 14.2 and 14.3 report changes in labor productivity and MFP at the in-
dustry level, those tables do not show which of the industries made the largest
contributions to the post-1995 surge of aggregate productivity growth. Addi-
tionally, we need to make sure that our industry productivity results are con-
sistent with the macro-level results that have appeared in other studies, such
as Oliner and Sichel (2000, 2002) and Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000).8
In this section, we aggregate our industry productivity measures and
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8. This responds to a point raised in oral discussion of our previous paper, a point that
could not be answered until data for all ﬁfty-four industries were analyzed.show the contributions of individual industry productivities to aggregate-
and sector-level productivity measures. We ﬁnd that the industries within
the services sector account for the bulk of U.S. productivity growth after
1995, both labor productivity and MFP. Services industries account for all
of the post-1995 acceleration. The goods-producing industries, taken to-
gether, make no net contribution to the recent acceleration of U.S. pro-
ductivity growth.
14.5.1 Industry and Aggregate Productivity Relations
We presented, in table 14.1, sector-level productivity estimates formed
by aggregating industry outputs and inputs and then computing produc-
tivity at the aggregate level. We call such measures “direct” aggregate-level
productivity measures, or direct sector-level measures, such as the goods-
producing and services-producing sectors, manufacturing durables pro-
duction, and so forth.
Direct aggregate or sector productivity growth is not just the aggrega-
tion of productivity changes within the individual industries contained in
the sector. Aggregate productivity can also change because of realloca-
tions across industries. As we (and others, including Stiroh [2002] and Jor-
genson, Ho, and Stiroh [2006]) show, aggregated industry productivity es-
timates generally exceed direct aggregate-level productivity change
because of reallocation of resources across industries. These reallocation
eﬀects are an important and interesting part of the productivity resurgence
story that has been overlooked in macro productivity studies.
We rely on Stiroh’s (2002) formula that relates the industry measures of
gross output labor productivity to aggregate value added per worker:
(3) d ln LPV   ∑
i
wid ln LPi
Q    ∑
i
wid ln Li   d ln L 
  ∑
i
mi(d ln Mi   d ln Qi) ,
where
LPV   aggregate value added per worker,
LPi
Q   gross output per worker in industry i,
wi   the two-period average of the share of industry i’s nominal value
added in aggregate value-added, and
mi   the two-period average of the ratio of industry i’s nominal pur-
chased inputs to aggregate value added, and, 
K, L, and Mare the standard notations for capital, labor, and intermediate
inputs.
In this formulation, we can think of d ln LPVas the direct aggregate-level
labor productivity growth discussed earlier and displayed in table 14.1.
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mate is a combination of (a) an industry productivity eﬀect equal to the
weighted sum of the growth in the industry productivities, where the
weights are the industry shares of total value added; and (b) two realloca-
tion terms that capture the shift of output among industries with variations
in their levels of labor productivity and intermediate input intensity.9
As an intuitive example, suppose industry A contracts out a portion of
its activities to industry B. This intermediate deepening (d ln Mi   d ln Qi)
may raise labor productivity in industry A (presuming that industry A rids
itself of labor employed in its own less productive activities), because less
labor is required per unit of output in industry A. But contracting out can-
not by itself raise aggregate labor productivity; it will only cause aggregate
labor productivity to rise if industry Bis more productive in the contracted
activities than was industry A. The reallocation terms capture this eﬀect.
They will be positive when shifts in economic activity go from less-
productive to more-productive industries and will be negative in the oppo-
site case.
Domar (1961) expressed the rate of aggregate MFP growth as a weighted
average of the industry (gross output) MFP growth rates, with weights
equal to the ratios of industry gross output to aggregate value added. That
framework was generalized and developed more fully in Hulten (1978) and
Gollop (1979). The important point is that productivity improvements at
the industry level contribute to the aggregate economy in two ways—ﬁrst,
through direct cost reductions for the industries’ outputs that are part of ﬁ-
nal demand and, second, through reductions in the cost of intermediate in-
puts for other industries.
For the aggregation of MFP, we have relied on the generalization of the
Domar weights given in Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni (1987):
(4) d ln MFPV   ∑
i
vid ln MFPi
Q    ∑
i
visi
k d ln Ki   s  




id ln Li   s  
l d ln L 
where
vi   two-period average of the ratio of industry i’s gross output to aggre-
gate value added (Domar weights), and
si   the two-period average share in industry iof the designated factor’s (K
or L) income in nominal gross output.
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9. This formulation diﬀers from that of Nordhaus (2002) because it uses chain index
weights (the vi terms), and it adds an additional source of reallocation by measuring labor
productivity at the industry level with gross output instead of value added.Our aggregations of both labor productivity and MFP use Törnqvist
chain indexes; that is, the weights are averages of adjacent periods, not
single-period or base-period weights.10 The Domar weights (the ﬁrst ele-
ment of equation [4]) can best be thought of as the product of two steps in
the aggregation: (a) the scaling up of the change in MFP at the industry
level by the ratio of gross output to value added at the industry level, and
(b) the aggregation using value added weights.11
14.5.2 Sector Aggregation of Industry Productivity
Using equations (3) and (4), a summary of the industry contributions to
the growth in the direct aggregate (value added) measures of labor pro-
ductivity and MFP are shown in table 14.4.
Because the contributions of industry productivity changes are oﬀset by
resource reallocations (the among industries eﬀects) that reduce the ag-
gregate gain, the aggregation of industry labor productivity estimates more
than accounts for the growth of aggregate productivity in both periods. For
example, in 1987 to 1995, the aggregation of industry labor productivity
improvements (the within industry eﬀects, shown in italics in table 14.4)
yields 1.93 percent growth per year, which is nearly twice as much produc-
tivity growth as is recorded at the aggregate level (1.01 percent).
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10. Domar (1961) assumed a Cobb-Douglas function, which implies base-period weights
in a logarithmic index.
11. At the level of individual industries, MFP computed from the gross output framework
will always be less than MFP computed from the value added data; however, the contribution
to the aggregate MFP is the same for both concepts.
Table 14.4 Aggregation of industry contributions to labor and multifactor
productivity growth, nonfarm business sector, 1987–2001 (trend growth




Direct aggregate levela 1.01 2.46 1.45
Intermediate inputs recallocation(–) –0.48 0.14 0.62
Labor reallocation –0.44 –0.31 0.13
Value-added weighted industry aggregate 1.93 2.63 0.70
Multifactor productivity
Direct aggregate level 0.56 1.44 0.88
Input reallocation –0.09 –0.14 –0.04
Domar weighted industry aggregate 0.66 1.58 0.92
Source:Equations (3) and (4) of text, and appendix tables A-5 and A-6 (Triplett and Bosworth
2004).
aDiﬀers from table 14.2 because it is a trend rate of change.On the other hand, because the reallocation terms have had a less nega-
tive inﬂuence in recent years, more of post-1995 labor productivity growth
within the industries feeds through to the aggregate level—the weighted
industry productivity changes (2.63 percent per year) total only 0.17 points
higher than the direct aggregate estimate (2.46 percent). Put another way,
the aggregate post-1995 acceleration of 1.45 (2.46 – 1.01) percentage points
per year in labor productivity growth is boosted by changes in (i.e., less
negative) reallocation terms. For this reason, the acceleration (1.45 points)
in aggregate productivity growth is roughly twice as large as is evident from
a straight aggregation of the ﬁfty-four individual industries (0.70 points
per year).12
The lower part of table 14.4 indicates that the reallocation terms are less
important in the aggregation of the (gross output) industry measures of
MFP growth. The aggregation of industry MFP is formed using Domar
weights, as indicated in equation (4). The aggregation of industry MFPs is
larger than direct aggregate-level MFP for both periods, but the realloca-
tion term is small (only –0.14, for 1995–2001). Moreover, the acceleration
in MFP is the same (about 0.9 points), whether calculated from the direct
aggregate or by aggregating industry MFPs.
14.5.3 Industry Contributions to Aggregate Productivity Growth
The contributions of individual industries to aggregate productivity
growth are shown, for all twenty-nine services industries and for the major
aggregates, in table 14.5. The industry contributions in table 14.5 sum to
the totals that are given by the ﬁrst terms in equations (3) and (4), that is,
to the bottom line of table 14.4. This aggregation of the industry produc-
tivities is repeated as the top line in table 14.5. As we have already noted,
the total industry productivity contribution is larger than the direct aggre-
gate-level productivity change shown in table 14.4 for the nonfarm busi-
ness aggregate because the direct industry contributions include realloca-
tion eﬀects.
Similarly, the sector aggregations in table 14.5 (indicated in italic type)
are the sums of the industry contributions within the sector. Accordingly,
one should interpret industry (and sector) contributions in table 14.5 in the
following way: they show the contribution of industry i(or the industriesin
sector j) to the total of all industry contributions to productivity change.For
example, table 14.5 shows that the two machinery industries (within which
are located computer and semiconductor manufacturing) contribute
about 17.5 percent of the total increase in industry labor productivity
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12. This variation between the aggregate and the industry results is largely due to changes
in the relationship between gross output and value added—what we have labeled reallocation
of the intermediate inputs. If labor productivity is measured at the industry level using value
added, the reallocation term is limited to changes in the distribution of labor among the in-






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.([0.15   0.31]/2.63) between 1995 and 2001 and 32 percent ([0.22   0.29]/
1.58) of the total industry MFP growth.
In contrast, the post-1995 resurgence in labor productivity can be traced
largely to productivity growth in the services-producing industries. Of the
total labor productivity growth of 2.63 percent per year after 1995, services
industries account for 73 percent of the total (1.72/2.63), while goods-
producing industries account for the rest (27 percent, or 0.71/2.63). Im-
provements within durables manufacturing are more than oﬀset by slow
productivity growth in mining and continued outright declines in con-
struction.
Of the ﬁfty-four industries, thirty industries show an increased contri-
bution after 1995, and nineteen of those are in services. Within services, the
largest contributors to post-1995 labor productivity growth are retail and
wholesale trade, ﬁnance (speciﬁcally, brokerage ﬁrms), business services,
and a miscellaneous grouping of other services.13 Each of the ﬁrst three of
these large services subsectors contributes as much or more to aggregate
post-1995 productivity growth as either industrial machinery or electrical
machinery, which have received so much attention because of their elec-
tronics components. These ﬁve services industries represent 70 percentage
points of the post-1995 aggregate acceleration in labor productivity (see
the “changes” column of table 14.5), and the next ten most important con-
tributors to the acceleration (all of which are in services) add only 30 per-
centage points.
Many of the industries that made the largest contributions to the re-
surgence of growth in labor productivity also play a large role in the accel-
eration of MFP growth. Again, the improvements are dominated by the
gains in the services-producing industries, which contribute three quarters
(1.20/1.58) of the MFP growth, post-1995, and 0.92 points of the net 0.88
points of acceleration (that is, more than the total). The top contributors
to the post-1995 MFP acceleration (retail trade, wholesale trade, brokerage
firms, and health) are all in services, closely followed by industrial machin-
ery, which includes computers.14 As shown in the table, the contribution
of durable-goods manufacturing to the improvement is large, but it is oﬀ-
set by declines in other goods-producing industries, including nondur-
ables manufacturing.
Twenty-seven of the ﬁfty-four industries show a post-1995 acceleration
of the trend growth in MFP, and seventeen are services-producing indus-
tries. Despite the similarity of the large contributing industries, the cross-
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13. As mentioned previously, we believe that the productivity improvements recorded in
other services are partly due to changes in the methodology for measuring the price deﬂators
for output.
14. The large positive contribution of health arises because the MFP change is less negative
after 1995.industry correlation between the post-1995 acceleration of labor produc-
tivity and MFP is a surprisingly low 0.33.
There is also a large change in the role of business services, which was a
major source of the rise of labor productivity, but it makes a negative con-
tribution to the improvement in overall MFP growth. Its positive contri-
bution to labor productivity is largely the result of a rapid increase in its
weight; labor productivity growth was high but not accelerating after 1995.
However, a large increase in purchases of intermediate inputs results in a
post-1995 decline in MFP.
14.6 The Role of IT Capital
A number of studies have reported that increasing use of IT capital con-
tributed to the acceleration of labor productivity after 1995, in the stan-
dard paradigm of capital deepening, but that non-IT capital per worker
did not accelerate after 1995 (see, for example, Oliner and Sichel 2002). Us-
ing the labor productivity decomposition in equation (1) and applying it to
the nonfarm value added data, we ﬁnd the same result: overall, increasing
IT capital per worker contributed 0.85 points to labor productivity (value
added per worker) growth after 1995, and 0.49 percentage points to accel-
eration (line 1 of table 14.6). Non-IT capital services contributed positively
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Table 14.6 Contributions of IT capital to labor productivity growth, by industry,
1987–2001 (trend rates of change)
Contribution to industry
Industry 1987–1995 1995–2001 Change
Private nonfarm business 0.36 0.85 0.49
Goods-producing industries 0.12 0.19 0.07
Mining 0.09 0.24 0.15
Construction 0.06 0.09 0.03
Manufacturing 0.11 0.18 0.07
Durable goods 0.12 0.24 0.12
Nondurable goods 0.15 0.23 0.08
Service-producing industries 0.23 0.59 0.37
Transportation 0.13 0.31 0.17
Communications 0.86 1.29 0.43
Electric, gas, and sanitary services 0.25 0.25 0.00
Wholesale trade 0.49 1.42 0.93
Retail trade 0.11 0.26 0.15
Finance and insurance 0.62 1.09 0.48
Real estate (excluding owner-occupied housing) –0.01 0.02 0.04
Other service industries 0.14 0.47 0.33
Source: The direct estimates of the contribution to labor productivity in individual industries
are from the gross-output estimates of table A-1, except for the nonfarm aggregates which are
value added estimates from table A-2 (Triplett and Bosworth 2004).to growth, but only a little less than 0.1 point to acceleration (estimate not
shown in the table, but incorporated into appendix table A1 of Triplett and
Bosworth [2004]).
Again, as with so many aspects of recent U.S. productivity performance,
most of the IT capital deepening eﬀect on U.S. labor productivity growth
in recent years originates in the services industries. As shown in the left-
hand side of table 14.6, the increased use of IT contributed 0.59 percentage
points of labor productivity growth in the services-producing industries af-
ter 1995, which was 0.4 points more than the contribution of IT capital in
these industries in the previous period (0.23). In contrast, IT contributed
less than a tenth of a point (0.07) to labor productivity acceleration in the
goods-producing industries. Triplett and Bosworth (2006) show that the
service-producing industries are also more intensive users of IT than the
goods-producing industries. It is thus not surprising that in such IT-
intensive industries as communications, wholesale trade, and ﬁnance and
insurance, IT contributes substantially to their post-1995 labor produc-
tivity growth—1.29, 1.42, and 1.09 points, respectively (left-hand side of
table 14.6).
Table 14.6 shows the contributions of IT to the change in labor produc-
tivity within each industry. In table 14.7, we use the Domar weights to com-
pute the IT contribution in individual industries to the total IT contribu-
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Table 14.7 Contributions of IT capital to aggregate labor productivity growth,
nonfarm business sector, 1987–2001 (trend rates of change)
Contribution to aggregate
Industry Domar weight 1987–1995 1995–2001 Change
Private nonfarm business 186.9 0.38 0.77 0.39
Goods-producing industries 73.1 0.09 0.15 0.06
Mining 3.1 0.00 0.01 0.00
Construction 9.3 0.01 0.01 0.00
Manufacturing 59.7 0.09 0.13 0.05
Durable goods 31.7 0.04 0.08 0.04
Nondurable goods 28.1 0.04 0.06 0.01
Service-producing industries 113.8 0.28 0.62 0.34
Transportation 7.8 0.01 0.02 0.01
Communications 5.6 0.05 0.07 0.02
Electric, gas, and sanitary services 5.6 0.01 0.01 0.00
Wholesale trade 12.4 0.06 0.18 0.12
Retail trade 17.4 0.02 0.05 0.03
Finance and insurance 14.8 0.08 0.13 0.05
Real estate (excluding owner-occupied 
housing) 11.2 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other service industries 39.1 0.05 0.16 0.11
Note: The contributions to the aggregate are computed using Domar weights and gross out-
put at the industry level and aggregating up to the subsector and sector level.tion.15 The services-producing industries are responsible for 80 percent
(0.62/0.77) of the contribution of IT capital to post-1995 productivity
growth in the nonfarm economy. The contributions were particularly large
from wholesale trade, ﬁnance, and other services (primarily business ser-
vices and health).
We have shown that the IT contribution to labor productivity growth
and also the MFP contribution are both located largely in services indus-
tries. It is perhaps tempting to link these two results to infer that in some
way acceleration in MFP growth in the services industries is linked to their
increased use of IT capital. Both the productivity model and the evidence,
however, are inconsistent with this hypothesis.
In the growth accounting framework, MFP is a residual; it shows the
productivity growth that is not attributable to growth in inputs (including
growth in IT capital inputs). Thus, IT usage should not, in principle, be
associated with MFP growth because the inﬂuence of IT on productivity
growth is already estimated. However, IT and MFP growth could be re-
lated in the data for at least three reasons:
1. In the growth accounting framework, one assumes that inputs,
including IT inputs, earn normal returns. If IT in fact earns a larger net return
than other capital, which is sometimes asserted, then IT’s contribution
to output growth would be understated, the error would inappro-
priately inﬂate MFP, and IT and (mismeasured) MFP would be corre-
lated.
2. It is often asserted that IT investment involves “coinvestments.”
Many of the coinvestments are probably not counted in the national ac-
counts investment data (software is capitalized and included, so software
is not a factor in the coinvestment that is omitted). If coinvestments are
missed, then the total investment associated with IT is understated by the
amount of the uncounted coinvestment, IT’s contribution is also under-
stated, the error inappropriately inﬂates MFP, and the error is correlated
with IT.
3. IT may facilitate entrepreneurial innovation. Investment in innova-
tive resources and innovative activity may not be counted directly in na-
tional accounts, so again there is an understatement of inputs, a conse-
quent mismeasurement of MFP, and the measurement error is correlated
with IT.
We tested the IT-MFP hypothesis in the following manner. First, we
constructed measures of IT intensity by industry (Triplett and Bosworth
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15. As in other parts of this paper, the aggregation of the industry contributions (shown in
table 14.7) does not equal the IT contribution to the direct productivity measure because of
reallocation eﬀects discussed earlier. For that reason, the top line of table 14.7 does not equal
the top line of table 14.6. Note that reallocation eﬀects reduced the total contribution of IT
before 1995, but added to it after 1995.2006). Then we regressed the change in MFP post-1995 on the level of IT
capital intensity in 1995 (we used the proportion of capital services arising
from IT for this purpose). The correlation coeﬃcient was only 0.05 and was
not signiﬁcant.16 From this, we conclude that there is no association be-
tween IT investment and MFP growth (which is what the growth account-
ing model suggests) and no evidence that IT is “special.” Information tech-
nology can be analyzed like any other productive input.
14.7 Consistency with Other Studies: IT-producing 
and Services Industries
Studies using macro approaches, including Oliner and Sichel (2000) and
Gordon (2000, 2002), ﬁnd MFP acceleration in the United States after
1995, but also estimate (in somewhat indirect ways) that two-thirds to all
of the aggregate acceleration is accounted for by MFP acceleration in the
industries that produce IT investment goods. For example, Gordon (2002,
65) concludes: “There has been no acceleration of MFP growth outside of
computer production and the rest of durable manufacturing.”
The view that all recent MFP growth is in the IT-producing industries
suggests that the post-1995 productivity acceleration is fragile because it
rests entirely in a single set of goods-producing industries. Additionally,
it suggests that recent U.S. productivity performance diﬀers from that of
Europe mainly because the United States has a larger IT-producing sec-
tor. In contrast, our ﬁnding that MFP acceleration is broadly—though
not universally—based in services industries leads to the view that some-
thing signiﬁcant did change in the U.S. economy. Moreover, changes in
IT-using industries probably explained a good amount of the recent pro-
ductivity diﬀerences between the United States and Western Europe.
Thus, reconciling the apparently conﬂicting ﬁndings has considerable im-
portance.
Before considering the research results, we address an essential method-
ological point.
14.7.1 A Note on “Exhausting” Total MFP
The macro studies “back oﬀ” estimates of MFP in IT-producing indus-
tries from the growth of direct aggregate-level MFP. Doing so seems to ex-
haust or nearly exhaust total MFP growth and to leave little room for MFP
growth in the rest of the economy. For example, backing oﬀ Oliner and
Sichel’s IT MFP estimate (0.77 percent per year) from the trend BLS MFP
growth estimate (1.17 percent per year) appears to leave only 0.40 percent
per year MFP growth outside the IT producing industries (see the ﬁrst col-
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16. The same correlation on labor productivity produced a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, as ex-
pected. See Triplett and Bosworth (2004, 31).umn of table 14.8, row 5).17 This calculation is the basis for Gordon’s state-
ment, quoted previously. If one backs the same IT estimate from the
growth in the direct aggregate-level MFP measure from BEA data (which
is greater, for the reasons discussed in section 14.4), MFP growth outside
IT appears a little greater because the overall MFP growth estimate is
larger in the BEA database, as explained earlier (refer to the second column
of table 14.8).
However, we showed in section 14.5 that the sum of all industries’ MFP
growth exceeds growth in the direct MFP measure because of realloca-
tions. If one wants to determine whether non-IT industries contribute to
MFP growth, clearly the starting point is the aggregation of industry MFP
growth rates, not the direct aggregate-level measure that includes realloca-
tions. As the third column of table 14.8 shows, that backing oﬀ exercise
leaves more room for non-IT MFP. For illustration, backing oﬀ our indus-
try IT MFP measure (0.51) from the net industry MFP change leaves 1.07
percent per year contribution to net MFP growth from industries outside
the IT-producing sector, more than twice the amount that originates inside
the IT-producing sector.
One might think of column three as the answer to the question: “Has
there been any net MFP growth outside the IT sector?” But if one really
wants to determine whether there has been anyMFP growth outside the IT
sector, then the starting point should be the sum of all the industries hav-
ing positive MFP growth. This is shown in the last column of table 14.8.
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Table 14.8 Alternative “backing out” exercises for comparisons of IT-producing and other
industries multifactor productivity (MFP), 1995–2001 (trend rates of change)
BEA data set
Sum 
Direct Sum  (positive 
BLS MFP (industry  industry 
MFP estimate MFPs) MFPs)
1. Nonfarm business MFP (table 14.5) 1.17 1.44 1.58 2.09a
Contribution of:
2. Machinery industries MFP (table 14.6) 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51
3. Oliner and Sichel (2002) IT-industry MFP 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77
4. Remainder (row 1 – row 2   MFP outside IT) 0.66 0.93 1.07 1.58
5. Remainder (row 1 – row 3   MFP outside IT) 0.40 0.67 0.87 1.32
Source: Authors’ computations as explained in text.
aSum of positive (only) industry MFP growth, from tables 14.2–14.6.
17. For comparability, we show trend rates of MFP growth in table 14.8. Using Oliner and
Sichel’s (2002) average annual rate of MFP growth to the 2001 recession year (0.99) yields
only 0.23 for the non-IT growth rate.Positive MFP growth in industries outside the IT-producing sector con-
tributes three times as much MFP growth as do the IT-producing indus-
tries, using our measure of IT MFP growth, and twice the IT-industry con-
tribution, using Oliner and Sichel’s IT estimate. By any measure of MFP in
IT production, MFP growth outside IT production is substantial and
greatly exceeds the MFP contribution from IT production.
There is no necessary conﬂict between our ﬁnding of substantial MFP
growth in services industries and the ﬁnding of high MFP growth in the IT-
producing industries. The misinterpretation arises because some re-
searchers, observing a large MFP contribution from the production of IT,
have concluded incorrectly that there can be no other similar contributions
of equal size from other industries. Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2005, 462)
make the same point: The “conclusion . . . that all productivity growth orig-
inates in these two IT-producing industries . . . would be highly misleading,
since the sum of the contributions of . . . agriculture and wholesale trade . . .
also exhaust productivity growth for the economy as a whole.”
14.7.2 Reconciliation
Our estimates, however, are diﬀerent from those of other studies.
Two major alternatives to our study are the macro study by Oliner and
Sichel (2002) and the industry study by Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2006).
With respect to the contributions of IT capital deepening and of MFP in
the IT-producing industries, Gordon’s (2002) inﬂuential study relies on
Oliner and Sichel’s estimates, though he also buttresses them with inde-
pendent calculations of his own. Accordingly, we focus on the Oliner and
Sichel and Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh studies.
Our study diﬀers from the others in its output measure and its labor in-
put measure, both of which are tied to our use of the BEA industry data-
base. The Oliner and Sichel (2002) study relies on the BLS output measure
(from the expenditure side of the accounts), which means that their output
measure grows less rapidly after 1995 than our income-side measure be-
cause the statistical discrepancy (the diﬀerence between the two sides of
the accounts) grew after 1995. Other things equal, the income-side mea-
sure we use gives more labor productivity after 1995 and more MFP
growth. The benchmark revision to GDP that was released in December
2003 raised the product-side estimate more than the income side, which
implies that our product-side productivity measure hold up.
Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2006) use a wider deﬁnition of output (it in-
cludes both government and the household sectors) than employed in our
study or in Oliner and Sichel (2002). The wider measure grows somewhat
more slowly, implying less MFP growth, other things equal (partly because
the way government output is measured assures low productivity growth in
the government sector).
Additionally, the labor input in our study does not include a labor qual-
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bor quality is growing, this means that we have too much MFP growth be-
cause the contribution of the mismeasured input falls into MFP.
All studies estimate capital deepening and distinguish IT capital deep-
ening from improvements in the non-IT capital-labor ratio. Jorgenson, Ho,
and Stiroh (2006) estimates of capital deepening and IT capital deepening
are by far the largest, mainly because of their diﬀerent output concept (the
growth in IT capital services in the household “industry” after 1995 is the
largest of any industry). Our estimate of IT capital deepening is slightly
smaller (by 0.17 points) than that of Oliner and Sichel (2002). We do not
know why, but this is not a major factor in the comparisons. Less capital
deepening, of course, increases our aggregate MFP estimate, relative to
Oliner and Sichel.
Putting all this together, these three factors—diﬀerence in output mea-
sure, diﬀerence in estimates of IT capital deepening, and our omission of
labor quality—cause our aggregate non-IT MFP estimate to exceed that of
Oliner and Sichel (2002) by around 0.4–0.5 points after 1995.18 Our MFP
estimate is more than twice that of Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2006),
mostly because of the eﬀects of including the household and government
sectors in their estimates.
14.8 Measurement Issues
The BEA industry data set has been substantially improved in recent
years. The situation has changed signiﬁcantly since Baily and Gordon
(1988) and the Griliches (1992) volume on services drew attention to some
of the measurement problems. As discussed previously, the most notable
change has been the inclusion of measures of gross output and intermedi-
ate purchases in a system that previously relied exclusively on value added
(GDP originating) measures of output.19 At the industry level, gross out-
put provides a measure that is much more closely aligned with the micro-
economic concept of a production function and imposes fewer restrictions
on the nature of the substitutions among factor inputs and technical
change.
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18. Triplett and Bosworth (2004, chapter 2) consider this matter at greater length, but a
deﬁnitive answer awaits publication of Capital, Labor, Energy, Materials, and Services
(KLEMS) data on the new North American Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) “Elec-
tronics and Computers” sector, which is the appropriate industry grouping for the purpose.
Previous analyses have been conducted at the level of the total-machinery industries, which
makes it diﬃcult to extract the contribution of electronics manufacturing from the non-high-
tech sectors.
19. The expansion was made possible by the increased information on services provided by
the Census Bureau surveys and the expansion of the Producer Price Index program of the
BLS to cover a larger number of service industries.At the same time, the expanded usefulness of the data set has highlighted
some of the remaining important problems. In the following sections we
address four aspects: inconsistent data sources, a comparison of alterna-
tive output data sets, negative productivity growth industries, and short-
comings in the labor input data.
14.8.1 Inconsistent Data Sources
At present, the BEA constructs the industry measures of value added
and its components from sources that correspond to those used to measure
the income side of the national accounts—that is, the Internal Revenue
Services (IRS) for proﬁts and the BLS for wages and salaries. Those data
that are derived from company reports must be converted to an establish-
ment basis. In contrast, the measures of gross output are constructed from
the sources used to construct the input-output (I-O) accounts, primarily
the Census Bureau business censuses and surveys, which focus directly on
establishments. Intermediate purchases are then estimated residually as
gross output minus value added. This contrasts with the I-O accounts that
provide direct estimates of both gross output and purchased inputs, with
value added being the residual.
The industry estimates of value added (GDP originating) can diﬀer sub-
stantially from those of the I-O accounts (see the detailed comparisons in
Triplett and Bosworth [2004, chapter 2]). As noted by Yuskavage (2000),
the diﬀerences are larger at the industry level with some oﬀset within in-
dustry groups. Somewhat surprising, the percentage diﬀerences are larger
and more volatile for the goods-producing industries, but that is partially
a reﬂection of the more detailed division of the goods-producing indus-
tries.
The quantity (constant price) measures of gross output are computed at
the four-digit SIC level largely using price indexes from the BLS price pro-
grams and aggregated as chained indexes to the two-digit industry level. In-
formation about the composition of purchased inputs is taken from the 
I-O accounts, but it must be interpolated for non-I-O years. Thus, purchased
inputs lack the compositional detail needed to compute high-quality chain
indexes. The volume measure of value added is eﬀectively computed as the
diﬀerence between the quantity values of gross output and purchased in-
puts.
While one expects measures of labor productivity growth to vary be-
tween gross output and value added, the magnitudes are often very large
and volatile over time. For our group of ﬁfty-four industries, the standard
deviation of the diﬀerence between the two growth rates is 3.6 percentage
points even though the average growth is 2 percent in each case. It is un-
likely that the volatility could result solely from changing patterns of out-
sourcing. Instead, all of the inconsistencies between the income and I-O
data sources are concentrated in the residual calculations of each indus-
Services Productivity in the United States 437try’s intermediate purchases. Purchased inputs matter less for MFP as the
computation of MFP using either gross output or value added yields es-
sentially the same estimates of its contribution to aggregate (value added)
MFP.
In the long run, the objective is to fully integrate the GDP by industry
and the I-O accounts. The integration is currently incomplete because of
insuﬃcient source information, and the problem is particularly severe for
services. Census Bureau sources cover about 90 percent of gross output but
only 30 percent of purchased inputs. The business surveys of the Census
Bureau are being expanded to provide more detail, and the BEA is plan-
ning to achieve a partial integration of its GDP by industry and the annual
I-O accounts over the next several years.
14.8.2 Alternative Data Sets
The BEA is not the only source of industry-level data. Two diﬀerent pro-
grams of the BLS—its productivity program and its employment projec-
tions program—also produce industry data that can be used for produc-
tivity analysis.
The BLS Productivity Oﬃce produces detailed industry output and pro-
ductivity estimates within manufacturing. The manufacturing-output se-
ries of the BLS and the BEA are both gross output, and they both rely on
Census Bureau shipments data. However, the BLS constructs its own mea-
sures of output and excludes an estimate of intramanufacturing shipments.
At the level of two-digit SIC industries, the diﬀerence in output growth can
be quite substantial, ranging from –0.8 percent to  1.0 percent per year
over the 1995 to 2000 period. The diﬀerences seem too large to explain by
changes in the amount of intramanufacturing shipments, but we do not
know the sources. A recent very thorough and enlightening analysis of out-
put trends as measured by the BEA and the BLS Productivity Oﬃce data
is Fraumeni et al. (2006).
More relevant for our focus on services, the employment projections
program of the BLS produces detailed industry measures of output and
employment over the period of 1972 to 2000, covering both goods-
producing and services-producing industries. This is a basic data source
for the productivity studies of Dale Jorgenson and his colleagues. The data
set includes output measures for a considerable number of the services-
producing industries that we have used in our analysis. Table 14.9provides
a comparison of the output growth rates over the 1987 to 2000 period for
twenty-eight of our twenty-nine industries, where it appears that the cov-
erage by SIC codes is the same.20
It is evident from the table that growth rates for individual industries
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20. The BLS projections oﬃce data set was not, unfortunately, considered in the otherwise









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.often diﬀer substantially between the BEA- and BLS-projections data sets.
The diﬀerences are large even for industries, such as transportation, com-
munications, and utilities, where we would believe that the quality of the
source data is quite high. For example, the BLS-projections data report a
substantial slowdown in airline output growth (comparing 1995–2000 with
the previous period), where the BEA data indicate acceleration. The BLS
measures also report less growth in the large retail- and wholesale-trade
sectors, where we found a large acceleration of growth in both labor pro-
ductivity and MFP. On the other hand, the BLS-projections data show
more output growth acceleration in depository banking, insurance, and
the amusement and recreation industry (the latter is one of our negative
productivity industries).
Using value added weights, we ﬁnd that the BEA data imply a slightly
faster growth of output in the services-producing industries as a whole in
both 1987–1995 and 1995–2000; but the magnitude of overall post-1995 ac-
celeration is the same. Thus, despite the large diﬀerences at the level of in-
dividual industries, the two data sets are in surprisingly close agreement
about the overall acceleration of output growth in the services-producing
sector. As it has been our experience that the two agencies produce very
similar employment estimates at the industry level, the BLS projections
programs’ output measures seem to oﬀer strong support for the ﬁnding in
the BEA industry data of a large improvement of productivity growth in
overall services, even though they conﬂict greatly with BEA output mea-
sures at the detailed level.
We have been surprised by the degree of overlap between the industry
programs and the BEA and the BLS Projections Oﬃce, yet it appears that
there has been very little eﬀort to compare and contrast their sources and
methods. It seems evident that there would be substantial beneﬁt to trac-
ing down the sources of diﬀerences in the alternative output measures. It is
confusing for the statistical agencies to publish such contradictory mea-
sures, particularly when the sources of variation are not documented.
While we are unlikely to see movement toward an integrated U.S. statisti-
cal system (where such redundancies would be eliminated by consolidation
of these statistical programs, thereby melding resources to improve the
data), this is one area where there would be signiﬁcant gains from greater
coordination of research eﬀorts between the two agencies.21
14.8.3 The Negative Productivity Growth Industries
Negative productivity growth always attracts skepticism, and well it
should. In our estimates, the following industries have negative labor pro-
ductivity growth over the 1995 to 2001 interval:
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21. Such a comparison is an obvious extension to the work reported in Fraumeni et al.
(2006).• Education –0.95 percent
• Amusement and recreation –0.41 percent
• Hotels –0.57 percent
• Insurance carriers –1.66 percent
• Local transit –0.61 percent
• Construction –1.12 percent
Analyses of the negative productivity issue include Corrado and Slifman
(1999) and Gullickson and Harper (2002). Both studies set the negative-
productivity industries (a larger number in their studies than in our results)
equal to zero and recomputed aggregate productivity growth. There is no
doubt some value to this procedure as a “what if?” exercise. However, we
see little reason for supposing that cutting oﬀ the left tail of the distribu-
tion of productivity changes improves the estimate of the mean.
Instead of mechanical “lopping oﬀthe tail” exercises, we believe that the
statistical agencies should seek to identify the sources of the negative
bias—that is, to take negative productivity growth as an indicator for allo-
cating resources to improve measurement. From our experience with the
Brookings economic measurement workshops and from other information
and research, we oﬀer the following hypotheses.
Education
Educational output was the subject of a Brookings workshop in which
two conclusions emerged. (a) No agreed on measure of the output of the
educational function itself exists, and (b) universities, and to an extent per-
haps secondary education as well, are classic multioutput ﬁrms, in the
sense that the cost function for their diﬀerent activities is not separable
on the inputs. For universities, joint outputs include, in addition to educa-
tion of students, research, lodging and meal services, and entertainment
(sports). These outputs interact with educational decision making (Ehren-
berg [2000] provides numerous examples from his tenure as dean at a ma-
jor university), but the output of these other activities is not normally in-
cluded in the “industry’s” output, which is usually deﬂated only with an
index of tuition. Interestingly, two of the joint products of universities
(lodging and entertainment) also exhibit negative labor productivity
growth (see our table 14.2), even when located in specialized ﬁrms. We sus-
pect that these relationships are neither coincidental nor insigniﬁcant,
even after allowing for the fact that universities do not pay even the mini-
mum wage to many workers in their entertainment activity. Moreover, at
least in some universities, the employment ﬁgures may be suspect if faculty
members devote an increasing amount of time to outside pursuits that do
not directly contribute to the output of their employers.
One concludes from this that there are all kinds of measurement prob-
lems in computing productivity of the educational sector, covering the def-
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Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1992) and also O’Mahoney and Stevens (2004)
estimate the output of education by assessing its contribution to human
capital and, therefore, to lifetime earnings streams of graduates. Their es-
timates are far larger than the output that is presently recorded in national
accounts, a result that is consistent with the hypothesis that educational
productivity is biased downward because of mismeasurement of educa-
tional output.
Amusement and Recreation
We know of no recent research on the output of the amusement and
recreation industries.
Hotels
For hotels, the McKinsey Global Institute (2001) found the poor labor
productivity performance of hotels consistent with other evidence, includ-
ing information from McKinsey’s own consulting practice. Some of the
quality improvements in hotel services, notably computerized reservation
services, are unpriced outputs that have clearly created beneﬁts to the cus-
tomer but are not captured in the output measures used in national ac-
counts. Thus, properly measured hotel productivity might not have nega-
tive growth.
Insurance
We suspect that negative productivity for insurance carriers is the result
of an inadequate and unworkable deﬁnition of insurance output in the Na-
tional Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) and the System of National
Accounts (SNA). The long international debate on this topic is reviewed in
Triplett (2001). In the national accounts, insurance output is deﬁned as
“premiums minus claims,” which means that the insurance company is de-
picted as administering the policy on the behalf of the policy holders and
not as absorbing and managing risk. However, Triplett points out that be-
cause no contract exists for the “service” of managing the claims pool on
behalf of the policy holders, no such service can be priced. Thus, the con-
cepts underlying the PPI price index for insurance (they price the premi-
ums, which we think makes economic sense—see Sherwood 1999) are in-
consistent with the national accounts view of insurance output.
Insofar as insurance companies have improved their management of
risk—which ought, other things equal, to reduce the margin of premiums
minis claims—these improvements are outside the scope of the national
accounts’ output measure. As additional evidence on this score, we note
the peculiar behavior of the data for insurance carriers and insurance
agents, considered together: at least one of them is almost always negative,
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one (or GDP revisions to one) are usually reﬂected in deterioration of the
measured performance of the other.
In Triplett and Bosworth (2004, chapter 7), we show that the national ac-
counts convention for measuring insurance carrier output accounts for the
industry’s negative measured productivity in the BEA industry accounts
data. Using BEA data, we reestimate output and labor productivity growth
using a premiums-plus-investment-income concept for current-price out-
put, with appropriate adjustments to the deﬂators. The alternative output
concept produces positive labor productivity growth in the insurance in-
dustry, not negative growth as does the current BEA output concept. The
exercise suggests where at least one measurement problem lies. However,
the industry’s rate of productivity growth remains small, on the order of
 0.5 percent (half of 1 percent) per year. We speculate that better allow-
ance for insurance companies’ handling of risk and better accounting for
the value of its new products would increase the measured rate of insur-
ance productivity even more.
Local Transit
Although we are not sure the data are correct, on its face the negative
productivity growth in local transit is consistent with substituting its own
internal labor for previously purchased inputs. Presumably, this would be
the result of regulation, union contracts, and the general climate under
which these services operate. The industry’s multifactor productivity
growth in the recent period is quite respectable (1.29 percent per year) and
goes in the opposite direction from its labor productivity. It is also possible
that the industry is an example of inconsistency in the source data.
Construction
Construction is an industry whose productivity performance has puz-
zled many economists (see Baily and Gordon 1988; Pieper 1990). Ours is a
paper on services, not on goods-producing industries, but we think that re-
search on measuring the output of construction deserves high priority.
Though major parts of construction output are deﬂated with hedonic price
indexes and have been for many years, deﬂators for other parts are clearly
inadequate. We understand that the producer price index program has
turned attention to producing deﬂators for this industry. The BEA is in-
troducing hedonic indexes for commercial construction in the 2003 bench-
mark revision, but these indexes rise more rapidly than the deﬂators they
replace, which would make the negative productivity in construction even
more negative.22
Services Productivity in the United States 443
22. Based on conversations with Bruce Grimm of the BEA.14.8.4 Labor Hours and Input by Industry
The labor input in our study is persons engaged in production, and not
hours, which are the labor input in the BLS productivity reports and in Jor-
genson, Ho, and Stiroh (2006); in addition, we do not apply a labor-quality
adjustment. Neither of these aspects is included in the BEA industry data
set, and we lacked the resources to estimate an index of labor quality at the
industry level. Our analysis indicates that omission of labor quality creates
problems for measuring industry MFP.
The reliance on employment, rather than hours, is an equally serious prob-
lem. We have, however, little conﬁdence in the estimates of hours across in-
dustries. The major source of industry hours is the BLS monthly establish-
ment survey, known as the “Current Employment Survey.” The objective of
this survey can only be described as archaic, for it persists in collecting hours
and earnings information only for what it calls “production workers” in
manufacturing and “nonsupervisory workers” in the rest of the economy.
The BLS productivity program estimates the hours of nonproduction
and supervisory workers, using whatever information it can ﬁnd. Hours of
self-employed and salaried workers are obtained from the BLS-Census
monthly household survey, the Current Population Survey (CPS).
Why the BLS emphasizes production and nonsupervisory workers for its
establishment employment surveys deﬁes understanding. Even on statistical
grounds, the decision is questionable. With the huge changes in workplace
organization and management in recent years, the boundary between what
is a “production” and a “nonproduction” worker has become so blurred that
it has lost its meaning. The same statement applies to “supervisory” and
“nonsupervisory” workers outside manufacturing, except there the distinc-
tion has always been unclear. This should not be news to a government sta-
tistical agency, for the line between what is a supervisory and a nonsupervi-
sory worker within government has also provoked great controversy.
But even if the boundaries between what the BLS does and does not col-
lect were sharply deﬁned, devoting the huge amount of resources that are
put into the BLS establishment program23to collecting hours and earnings
data on only a fraction of the workers shows a profound disregard for the
data that are important for economic analysis. Surely we want to know em-
ployment, earnings, and hours for all workers, not just for some fairly ar-
bitrarily deﬁned subset of them.
As we understand it, the BLS reasoning behind holding onto the “pro-
duction worker/nonsupervisory worker” deﬁnition for its establishment
surveys rests on preserving time series comparability. Although we, too,
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23. In both budgetary and sample size (so in resplendent burden), this is one of the largest
collections in the U.S. statistical system. Signiﬁcantly, other countries seem to collect the same
information at far less expense, Canada being one example.value time series continuity, it should not be at the cost of a failure to col-
lect the information that is most relevant for analysis. In any event, blur-
ring of the boundaries means that a constant deﬁnition does not produce
time series comparability.
When “measurement problems” come up in the analysis of productivity,
most economists immediately think about deﬂators. For industry produc-
tivity, the lack of a well-measured labor input is an equally serious problem
and more inexplicable because measuring worker hours in services indus-
tries is nowhere nearly so complicated as measuring services industries’
output prices—an area where the BLS (in its PPI program) has made ex-
emplary progress in recent years.
14.9 Conclusions
Using the relatively new BEA-BLS industry database, our study shows
that the post-1995 growth in U.S. productivity is largely a story of devel-
opments in the services industries. For both labor productivity and MFP,
productivity growth has been faster in services-producing industries than
in goods-producing industries in recent years. Because this was not the
case before 1995, services industries account for most of the acceleration
in labor productivity and all of the acceleration of MFP after 1995. We em-
phasize that this is not just a story of growth in a small number of large
services industries—twenty-four of twenty-nine services industries show
labor productivity growth after 1995, and in seventeen of them, labor
productivity growth accelerated. In more than half of the services indus-
tries, MFP accelerated after 1995.
In terms of contributions, services industries account for nearly three-
quarters of total industry labor productivity growth and more than three
quarters of total industry MFP growth in the period after 1995. Moreover,
capital deepening from IT investment in services industries accounts for 80
percent of the total IT eﬀect in the U.S. nonfarm sector after 1995.
The services productivity story in recent years is a striking change from
the past, and strikingly diﬀerent as well from the stereotypical view that
services industries are stagnant and without potential for technical
changes or rapid productivity improvement. In recent years, services in-
dustries have become an engine of economic growth.
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